Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA),
the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource
Management Plan (Plan) for Ohio's Wayne National Forest.
Although the Plan makes logging in the forest more likely —
it sets logging goals, selects the areas suited to timber
production, and determines which probable methods of timber
harvest are appropriate — it does not itself authorize the
cutting of any trees. Before the Service can permit logging, the
NFMA and applicable regulations require it to: (a) propose a
particular site and specific harvesting method, (b) ensure that
the project is consistent with the Plan, (c) provide affected
parties with notice and an opportunity to be heard, (d) conduct
an environmental analysis of the project, and (e) make a final
decision to permit logging, which affected persons may challenge
in administrative and court appeals. Furthermore, the Service
must revise the Plan as appropriate. When the Plan was first
proposed, the Sierra Club and another environmental organization
(collectively Sierra Club) pursued various administrative
remedies to bring about the Plan's modification, and then brought
this suit challenging the Plan's lawfulness on the ground that it
permits too much logging and too much clear-cutting. The District
Court granted the Forest Service summary judgment, but the Sixth
Circuit reversed. The latter court found the dispute justiciable
because, inter alia, it was "ripe for review" and held
that the Plan violated the NFMA.

Held: This dispute is not justiciable, because it is not
ripe for court review. Pp. 732-739.

(a) In deciding whether an agency decision is ripe, this Court
has examined the fitness of the particular issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding review.
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
149. Such an examination in this case reveals that the relevant
factors, taken together, foreclose court review. First,
withholding review will not cause the plaintiffs significant
"hardship." Ibid. The challenged Plan provisions do
not create adverse effects of a strictly legal kind; for example,
they do not establish a legal right to cut trees or abolish any
legal authority to object to trees being cut. Cf. United
States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U.S. 299,
309-310.
Page 727
Nor would delaying review cause the Sierra Club
significant practical harm. Given the procedural requirements
the Service must observe before it can permit logging, the Sierra
Club need not bring its challenge now, but may await a later time
when harm is more imminent and certain. Cf. Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U.S., at 152-154. Nor has the Sierra Club
pointed to any other way in which the Plan could now force it to
modify its behavior to avoid future adverse consequences, as, for
example, agency regulations can sometimes force immediate
compliance through fear of future sanctions. Cf., e.g.,
id., at 152-153. Second, court review now could interfere
with the system that Congress specified for the Forest Service to
reach logging decisions. From that agency's perspective,
immediate review could hinder its efforts to refine its policies
through revision of the Plan or application of the Plan in
practice. Cf., e.g., id., at 149. Here, the
possibility that further consideration will actually occur before
the Plan is implemented is real, not theoretical. Third, the
courts would benefit from further factual development of the
issues. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82. Review
now would require time-consuming consideration of the details of
an elaborate, technically based Plan, which predicts consequences
that may affect many different parcels of land in a variety of
ways, and which effects themselves may change over time. That
review would have to take place without benefit of the focus that
particular logging proposals could provide. And, depending upon
the agency's future actions to revise the Plan or modify the
expected implementation methods, review now may turn out to have
been unnecessary. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242. Finally, Congress has not
specifically provided for preimplementation judicial review of
such plans, unlike certain agency rules, cf., e.g.,
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871,
891, and forest plans are unlike environmental impact
statements prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 because claims involving such statements can never
get any riper. Pp. 732-737.

(b) The Court cannot consider the Sierra Club's argument that the
Plan will hurt it immediately in many ways not yet mentioned. That
argument makes its first appearance in this Court in the
briefs on the merits and is, therefore, not fairly presented.
Pp. 738-739.

105 F.3d 248, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the federal
respondents in support of petitioner, under this Court's Rule
Page 728
12.6. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman,
Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, and Deputy Solicitor
General Kneedler.

Steven P. Quarles argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Clifton S. Elgarten, Thomas R. Lundquist,
and William R. Murray.

Frederick M. Gittes argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Patti A. Goldman, Todd D. True, and
Alex Levinson.[fn*]

[fn*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the Alabama Forestry Association et al. by Charles Rothfeld; for
Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics et al. by Michael
Axline; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Robin L. Rivett;
for the Southeastern Ohio Oil & Gas Association by James S. Huggins
and M. Dale Leeper; and for the Washington Legal Foundation
et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp.

William V. Luneburg filed a brief for the Institute for
Fisheries Resources et al. as amici curiae.

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Sierra Club challenges the lawfulness of a federal land and
resource management plan adopted by the United States Forest
Service for Ohio's Wayne National Forest on the ground that the
plan permits too much logging and too much clearcutting. We
conclude that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial
review.

I

The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA) requires the
Secretary of Agriculture to "develop, maintain, and, as
appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for units
of the National Forest System." 90 Stat. 2949, as renumbered and
amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). The System itself is vast. It
includes 155 national forests, 20 national grasslands, 8 land
utilization projects, and other lands that together occupy nearly
300,000 square miles of land located in 44 States, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands. § 1609(a); 36 C.F.R. § 200.1(c)(2)
(1997); Office of the
Page 729
Federal Register, United States Government Manual 135 (1997/1998).
The National Forest Service, which manages the System, develops land
and resource management plans pursuant to NFMA, and uses these
forest plans to "guide all natural resource management activities,"
36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b) (1997), including use of the land for "outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and
wilderness." 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1). In developing the
plans, the Service must take both environmental and commercial
goals into account. See, e. g., § 1604(g);
36 C.F.R. § 219.1(a) (1997).

This case focuses upon a plan that the Forest Service has
developed for the Wayne National Forest located in southern Ohio.
When the Service wrote the plan, the forest consisted of 178,000
federally owned acres (278 sq. mi.) in three forest units that
are interspersed among privately owned lands, some of which the
Forest Service plans to acquire over time. See Land and Resource
Management Plan, Wayne National Forest, United States Department
of Agriculture, Forest Service, Eastern Region (1987) 1-3, 3-1,
A-13 to A-17 (hereinafter Plan). The Plan permits logging to
take place on 126,000 (197 sq. mi.) of the federally owned acres.
Id., at 4-7, 4-180. At the same time, it sets a ceiling
on the total amount of wood that can be cut — a ceiling
that amounts to about 75 million board feet over 10 years, and
which, the Plan projects, would lead to logging on about 8,000
acres (12.5 sq. mi.) during that decade. Id., at 4-180.
According to the Plan, logging on about 5,000 (7.8 sq. mi.) of
those 8,000 acres would involve clearcutting, or other forms of
what the Forest Service calls "even-aged" tree harvesting.
Id., at 3-5, 4-180.

Although the Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas of the
forest that are suited to timber production, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(k),
and determines which "probable methods of timber
harvest" are appropriate, § 1604(f)(2), it does not itself
authorize the cutting of any trees. Before the Forest Service
can permit the logging, it must: (a) propose a specific area in
Page 730
which logging will take place and the harvesting
methods to be used, Plan 4-20 to 4-25; 53 Fed. Reg. 26835-26836
(1988); (b) ensure that the project is consistent with the
Plan, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e) (1997);
(c) provide those affected by proposed logging notice and an
opportunity to be heard, 106 Stat. 1419 (note following
16 U.S.C. § 1612); 36 C.F.R. pt. 215, § 217.1(b) (1997);
Plan 5-2; (d) conduct an environmental analysis pursuant
to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA>),
42 U.S.C. § 4332 et seq.; Plan 4-14, to
evaluate the effects of the specific project and to
contemplate alternatives, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14, 1508.9(b)
(1997); Plan 1-2; and (e) subsequently make a final decision to
permit logging, which affected persons may challenge in
an administrative appeals process and in court, see 106 Stat.
1419-1420 (note following 16 U.S.C. § 1612); 5 U.S.C. § 701
et seq.. See also 53 Fed. Reg. 26834-26835 (1988); 58
Fed. Reg. 19370-19371 (1993). Furthermore, the statute requires
the Forest Service to "revise" the Plan "as appropriate."
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). Despite the considerable legal distance
between the adoption of the Plan and the moment when a tree is
cut, the Plan's promulgation nonetheless makes logging more
likely in that it is a logging precondition; in its absence
logging could not take place. See ibid. (requiring
promulgation of forest plans); § 1604(i) (requiring all later
forest uses to conform to forest plans).

When the Forest Service first proposed its Plan, the Sierra Club
and the Citizens Council on Conservation and Environmental
Control each objected. In an effort to bring about the Plan's
modification, they (collectively Sierra Club), pursued various
administrative remedies. See Administrative Decision of the
Chief of the Forest Service (Nov. 14, 1990), Pet. for Cert. 66a;
Appeal Decision, Wayne National Forest Land and Resource
Management Plan (Jan. 14, 1992), id., at 78a. The
Sierra Club then brought this lawsuit in federal court, initially
against the Chief of the Forest Service, the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Regional Forester, and the
Page 731
Forest Supervisor. The Ohio Forestry Association, some of whose
members harvest timber from the Wayne National Forest or process
wood products obtained from the forest, later intervened as a
defendant.

The Sierra Club's second amended complaint sets forth its legal
claims. That complaint initially states facts that describe the
Plan in detail and allege that erroneous analysis leads the Plan
wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. Second Amended
Complaint ¶¶ 13-47 (hereinafter Complaint), App. 16-23.
The Complaint then sets forth three claims for relief.

The first claim for relief says that the "defendants in approving
the plan for the Wayne [National Forest] and in directing or
permitting below-cost timber sales accomplished by means of
clearcutting" violated various laws including the NFMA,
the <NEPA>, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Complaint ¶ 49,
id., at 24.

The second claim says that the "defendants' actions in directing
or permitting below-cost timber sales in the Wayne [National
Forest] under the plan violate [their] duties as public
trustees." Complaint ¶ 52, ibid.

The third claim says that, in selecting the amount of the
forest suitable for timber production, the defendants followed
regulations that failed properly to identify "economically
unsuitable lands." Complaint ¶¶ 54-58,
id., at 25-26. It adds that, because the Forest
Service's regulations thereby permitted the Service to place
"economically unsuitable lands" in the category of land where
logging could take place, the regulations violated their
authorizing statute, NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq.,
and were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not
in accordance with law," pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Complaint ¶ 60,
App. 26.

The Complaint finally requests as relief: (a) a declaration
that the Plan "is unlawful as are the below-cost timber sales and
timbering, including clearcutting, authorized by the
Page 732
plan," (b) an "injunction prohibiting the defendants from permitting
or directing further timber harvest and/or below-cost timber sales"
pending Plan revision, (c) costs and attorney's fees, and (d)
"such other further relief as may be appropriate." Complaint
¶¶ (a)-(d), id., at 26-27.

The District Court reviewed the Plan, decided that the Forest
Service had acted lawfully in making the various determinations
that the Sierra Club had challenged, and granted summary judgment
for the Forest Service. Sierra Club v.
Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 503 (SD Ohio 1994). The
Sierra Club appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that the dispute was justiciable, finding both that the
Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit
was "ripe for review," there was no need to wait "until a
site-specific action occurs." Sierra Club v.
Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 250 (1997). The Court of Appeals
disagreed with the District Court about the merits. It held that
the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated
NFMA. Id., at 251-252. We granted certiorari to
determine whether the dispute about the Plan presents a
controversy that is justiciable now, and if so, whether the Plan
conforms to the statutory and regulatory requirements for a
forest plan.

II

Petitioner alleges that this suit is nonjusticiable both because
the Sierra Club lacks standing to bring this case and because the
issues before us — over the Plan's specifications for
logging and clearcutting — are not yet ripe for
adjudication. We find that the dispute is not justiciable,
because it is not ripe for court review. Cf. Steel Co.
v. Citizens For Better Environment, ante, at
100-101, n. 3.

As this Court has previously pointed out, the ripeness
requirement is designed

"to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
Page 733
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect
the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties." Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967).

In deciding whether an agency's decision is, or is not, ripe for
judicial review, the Court has examined both the "fitness of the
issues for judicial decision" and the "hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration." Id., at 149. To do
so in this case, we must consider: (1) whether delayed review
would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial
intervention would inappropriately interfere with further
administrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit
from further factual development of the issues presented. These
considerations, taken together, foreclose review in the present
case.

First, to "withhol[d] court consideration" at present will not
cause the parties significant "hardship" as this Court has come
to use that term. Ibid. For one thing, the provisions
of the Plan that the Sierra Club challenges do not create adverse
effects of a strictly legal kind, that is, effects of a sort that
traditionally would have qualified as harm. To paraphrase this
Court's language in United States v. Los Angeles &
Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309-310 (1927) (opinion of
Brandeis, J.), they do not command anyone to do anything or to
refrain from doing anything; they do not grant, withhold, or
modify any formal legal license, power, or authority; they do
not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability; they
create no legal rights or obligations. Thus, for example, the
Plan does not give anyone a legal right to cut trees, nor does
it abolish anyone's legal authority to object to trees being cut.

Nor have we found that the Plan now inflicts significant
practical harm upon the interests that the Sierra Club advances
— an important consideration in light of this Court's
Page 734
modern ripeness cases. See, e.g., Abbott
Laboratories, supra, at 152-154. As we have
pointed out, before the Forest Service can permit logging, it
must focus upon a particular site, propose a specific harvesting
method, prepare an environmental review, permit the public an
opportunity to be heard, and (if challenged) justify the proposal
in court. Supra, at 2-3. The Sierra Club thus will
have ample opportunity later to bring its legal challenge at a
time when harm is more imminent and more certain. Any such
later challenge might also include a challenge to the lawfulness
of the present Plan if (but only if) the present Plan then
matters, i.e., if the Plan plays a causal role with
respect to the future, then-imminent, harm from logging. Hence
we do not find a strong reason why the Sierra Club must bring its
challenge now in order to get relief. Cf. Abbott
Laboratories, supra, at 152.

Nor has the Sierra Club pointed to any other way in which the
Plan could now force it to modify its behavior in order to avoid
future adverse consequences, as, for example, agency regulations
can sometimes force immediate compliance through fear of future
sanctions. Cf. Abbott Laboratories, supra, at
152-153 (finding challenge ripe where plaintiffs must comply with
Federal Drug Administration labeling rule at once and incur
substantial economic costs or risk later serious criminal and
civil penalties for unlawful drug distribution); Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,
316 U.S. 407, 417-419 (1942) (finding challenge ripe where plaintiffs
must comply with burdensome Federal Communications Commission
rule at once or risk later loss of license and consequent serious
harm).

The Sierra Club does say that it will be easier, and certainly
cheaper, to mount one legal challenge against the Plan now, than
to pursue many challenges to each site-specific logging decision
to which the Plan might eventually lead. It does not explain,
however, why one initial site-specific victory (if based on the
Plan's unlawfulness) could not, through
Page 735
preclusion principles, effectively carry the day. See Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871,
894 (1990). And, in any event, the Court has not considered this kind
of litigation cost saving sufficient by itself to justify review in a
case that would otherwise be unripe. The ripeness doctrine reflects
a judgment that the disadvantages of a premature review that may
prove too abstract or unnecessary ordinarily outweigh the
additional costs of — even repetitive — postimplementation
litigation. See, e.g., ibid. ("The case-by-case
approach . . . is understandably frustrating to an
organization such as respondent, which has as its objective
across-the-board protection of our Nation's . . . forests . . . .
But this is the traditional, and remains the normal, mode of
operation of the courts"); FTC v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980); Renegotiation
Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24
(1974); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938).

Second, from the agency's perspective, immediate judicial review
directed at the lawfulness of logging and clearcutting could
hinder agency efforts to refine its policies: (a) through
revision of the Plan, e.g., in response to an
appropriate proposed site-specific action that is inconsistent
with the Plan, see 53 Fed. Reg. 23807, 26836 (1988), or (b)
through application of the Plan in practice, e.g., in
the form of site-specific proposals, which are subject
to review by a court applying purely legal criteria. Cf.
Abbott Laboratories supra, at 149; Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983). Cf. Standard
Oil Co. supra, at 242 (premature review "denies
the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and
to apply its expertise"). And, here, the possibility that
further consideration will actually occur before the Plan is
implemented is not theoretical, but real. See, e.g., 60
Fed. Reg. 18886, 18901 (1995) (forest plans often not fully
implemented), id., at 18905-18907 (discussing process
for amending forest plans); 58 Fed. Reg. 19369, 19370-19371
Page 736
(1993) (citing administrative appeals indicating that plans are
merely programmatic in nature and that plan cannot foresee all
effects on forest); Appeal Nos. 92-09-11-0008, 92-09-11-0009
(Lodging II) (successful Sierra Club administrative appeals
against Wayne timber harvesting site-specific projects). Hearing
the Sierra Club's challenge now could thus interfere with the
system that Congress specified for the agency to reach forest
logging decisions.

Third, from the courts' perspective, review of the Sierra Club's
claims regarding logging and clearcutting now would require
time-consuming judicial consideration of the details of an elaborate,
technically based plan, which predicts consequences that may
affect many different parcels of land in a variety of ways, and
which effects themselves may change over time. That review would
have to take place without benefit of the focus that a particular
logging proposal could provide. Thus, for example, the court
below in evaluating the Sierra Club's claims had to focus upon
whether the Plan as a whole was "improperly skewed," rather than
focus upon whether the decision to allow clearcutting on a
particular site was improper, say, because the site was better
suited to another use or logging there would cumulatively result
in too many trees being cut. See 105 F.3d, at 250-251. And, of
course, depending upon the agency's future actions to revise the
Plan or modify the expected methods of implementation, review now
may turn out to have been unnecessary. See Standard Oil
Co. supra, at 242.

This type of review threatens the kind of "abstract disagreements
over administrative policies," Abbott Laboratories, 387
U.S., at 148, that the ripeness doctrine seeks to avoid. In this
case, for example, the Court of Appeals panel disagreed about
whether or not the Forest Service suffered from a kind of general
"bias" in favor of timber production and clearcutting. Review
where the consequences had been "reduced to more manageable
proportions," and where the
Page 737
"factual components [were] fleshed out, by some concrete action"
might have led the panel majority either to demonstrate that bias
and its consequences through record citation (which it did not
do) or to abandon the claim. National Wildlife Federation supra,
at 891. All this is to say that further factual development would
"significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues
presented" and would "aid us in their resolution." Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978).

Finally, Congress has not provided for preimplementation
judicial review of forest plans. Those plans are tools for
agency planning and management. The Plan is consequently unlike
agency rules that Congress has specifically instructed the courts
to review "pre-enforcement." Cf. National Wildlife
Federation, supra, at 891; 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (Toxic
Substances Control Act) (providing preenforcement review of
agency action); 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a) (Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 6976
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976) (same); §
7607(b) (Clean Air Act) (same); 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(3) (Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act); Harrison v. PPG
Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592-593 (1980). Nor does
the Plan, which through standards guides future use of forests,
resemble an environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to
<NEPA>. That is because in this respect <NEPA>, unlike the NFMA,
simply guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular
result. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e) (requiring
that forest plans provide for multiple coordinated use of
forests, including timber and wilderness) with 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(requiring that agencies prepare environmental impact statements
where major agency action would significantly affect the
environment). Hence a person with standing who is injured by a
failure to comply with the <NEPA procedure may complain of that
failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can
never get riper.
Page 738

III

The Sierra Club makes one further important contrary argument.
It says that the Plan will hurt it in many ways that we have not
yet mentioned. Specifically, the Sierra Club says that the Plan
will permit "many intrusive activities, such as opening trails to
motorcycles or using heavy machinery," which "will go
forward without any additional consideration of their impact on
wilderness recreation." Brief for Respondents 34. At the same
time, in areas designated for logging, "affirmative measures to
promote undisturbed backcountry recreation, such as closing roads
and building additional hiking trails," will not take place.
Ibid. These are harms, says the Sierra Club, that will
not take place at a distant future time. Rather, they will take
place now.

This argument suffers from the legally fatal problem that it
makes its first appearance here in this Court in the briefs on
the merits. The Complaint, fairly read, does not include such
claims. Instead, it focuses on the amount and method of timber
harvesting. The Sierra Club has not referred us to any other
court documents in which it protests the Plan's approval of
motorcycles or machinery, the Plan's failure to close roads or to
provide for the building of trails, or other disruptions that the
Plan might cause those who use the forest for hiking. As far as
we can tell, prior to the argument on the merits here, the harm to
which the Sierra Club objected consisted of too much, and the
wrong kind of, logging.

The matter is significant because the Government concedes that if
the Sierra Club had previously raised these other kinds of harm,
the ripeness analysis in this case with respect to those
provisions of the Plan that produce the harm would be
significantly different. The Government's brief in the Court of
Appeals said:

"If, for example, a plan incorporated a final decision to close a
specific area to off-road vehicles, the plan itself
Page 739
could result in imminent concrete injury to a party with an
interest in the use of off-road vehicles in that area." Brief
for Federal Appellees in No. 94-3407 (CA6), p. 20.

And, at oral argument, the Solicitor General agreed that if the
Sierra Club's claim was "that [the] plan was allowing motorcycles
into a bird-watching area or something that like, that would be
immediately justiciable." Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. Thus, we believe
these other claims that the Sierra Club now raises are not fairly
presented here, and we cannot consider them.

IV

For these reasons, we find the respondents' suit not ripe for
review. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we
remand this case with instructions to dismiss.

It is so ordered.
Page 740